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Abstract—To avoid the single point of failure for the certificate
authority (CA) in MANET, a decentralized solution is proposed
where nodes are grouped into different clusters. Each cluster
should contain at least two confident nodes. One is known as
CA and the another as register authority RA. The Dynamic De-
militarized Zone (DDMZ) is proposed as a solution for protecting
the CA node against potential attacks. It is formed from one or
more RA node. The problems of such a model are: (1) Clusters
with one confident node, CA, cannot be created and thus clusters’
sizes are increased which negatively affect clusters’ services and
stability. (2) Clusters with high density of RA can cause channel
collision at the CA. (3) Clusters’ lifetime are reduced since RA
monitors are always launched (i.e., resource consumption). In this
paper, we propose a model based on mechanism design that will
allow clusters with single trusted node (CA) to be created. Our
mechanism will motivate nodes that do not belong to the confident
community to participate by giving them incentives in the form
of trust, which can be used for cluster’s services. To achieve this
goal, a RA selection algorithm is proposed that selects nodes
based on a predefined selection criteria function and location (i.e.,
using directional antenna). Such a model is known as moderate.
Based on the security risk, more RA nodes must be added to
formalize a robust DDMZ. Here, we consider the tradeoff between
security and resource consumption by formulating the problem
as a nonzero-sum noncooperative game between the CA and
attacker. Finally, empirical results are provided to support our
solutions.
Index Terms—MANET security, mechanism design, certificate
authority and clustering.
I. INTRODUCTION
In wired/wireless infrastructure networks, a trusted third
party, known as Certification Authority (CA), is needed to
certify users’ digital certificate that contains users’ public key
and identity. It is needed to provide a secure communication
among users and ensure some security requirements, such as;
authentication, confidentiality and integrity of transited data.
In classical Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [9], a Registra-
tion Authority (RA) is used to collect and analyze users’
requests before forwarding them to a CA to certify, issue and
renew user’s digital certificate. In Mobile Ad hoc Networks
(MANETs), a decentralized certificate authority approach [6],
[10], [23] is proposed, due to MANET characteristics, as
a solution to avoid single point of failure, MANET attacks
and consider nodes’ mobility. To handle these requirements, a
distributed clustering algorithm is proposed in [22] to cluster
nodes based on a set of trusted nodes that belong to a confident
community. A head cluster is selected among trusted nodes to
play the role of CA. To overcome a single point of failure
attack against CA, a set of one-hop nodes, RA, are selected
from the set of trusted nodes to form a Dynamic Demilitarized
Zone (DDMZ). The role of these nodes, besides registration
authority, is to protect the CA by filtering CA’s incoming
requests and monitoring the behavior of nodes in the cluster.
The approach is suitable once the confident community size
is large enough to grant at least two trusted nodes per cluster
(i.e., one CA and another RA).
The first limitation of the approach given in [22] is its
inability to form clusters with single trusted node and to form
the DDMZ from non-confident community. This will decrease
the number of clusters and increase clusters’ size which affect
clusters’ services and MANET stability. The second limitation
is clusters’ lifetime since all selected RA nodes are required
to run their monitor and consume resources. Moreover, a
high density DDMZ can increase the probability of channel
collision at CA. Finally, DDMZ formation is a limitation
since RA nodes are selected ignoring CA coverage area. This
violates the role of DDMZ since it allows an adversary to
launch attacks against CA from RA’s uncovered zones.
To overcome these limitations, the DDMZ must be built
based on nodes from non-confident community. To build the
DDMZ that can cover the CA coverage area, nodes must be
cooperative and selected by the CA based on specific selection
criteria where some of the parameters of the selection-criteria
are considered as private information. The limitations of such
a proposition are: (1) Nodes might behave selfishly in order
not to be selected as RA and consume resources. This will
be done by revealing a fake selection-criteria information. To
solve such a problem, incentives must be given to nodes to
motivate them to participate and serve as RA. The problem
that arises here is: How to design the incentives to motivate
nodes to participate and reveal their truthful information to
build the DDMZ? (2) To form the DDMZ that can cover the
CA coverage area, node’s location is required, which can be
used maliciously. To solve such a problem, directional antenna
is used to divide the CA coverage area into different sectors
in which the RA nodes are selected. Such a model is called as
moderate since few RA nodes are selected to filter the traffic of
CA. The question that we address here is: When to add more
RA nodes to form a robust DDMZ taking into consideration
security and resource consumption? We answer this question
by formulating a nonzero-sum non-cooperative game between
the CA and attacker where the attacker identity is unknown.
Bayesian game theory is used to solve such a game where the
CA’s threshold value to step to robust DDMZ is computed.
In this paper, we design a unified model that is able to:
• Motivate nodes from non-confident community to serve
as RA and build a moderate DDMZ.
• Prevent nodes from revealing fake information by de-
signing incentives based on Vickrey, Clarke and Groves
(VCG) mechanism where truth telling is the dominant
strategy among all nodes.
• Increase the CA protection through the design of mod-
erate DDMZ formation condition that can select RA
nodes based on their location.
• Increase the clusters’ lifetime by selecting the RA nodes
based on a specific selection-criteria function.
• Increase the number of clusters and reduce the cluster’s
size. This will help to efficiently serve the nodes of the
cluster and effect network stability. Moreover, it increases
the probability of detecting the misbehaving nodes.
• Run the robust DDMZ mode according to the security
needs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we discuss the related work on certification authority in
MANET and application of mechanism design to networks.
In Section III, we provide the problem statement. In Section
IV, MANET clustering and CA selection algorithm is given.
The moderate DDMZ model is given in Section V where
the RA election model, selection criteria function, mechanism
model and RA election algorithm are illustrated followed by
an example. Section VII presents empirical results. Finally,
Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
This section reviews related work on the distribution of the
certificate authority in MANET. Moreover, mechanism design
and game theory applications to networks are given.
A. Certification Authority in MANET
In [5], the authors proposed a system based on the dis-
tribution of the certification authority among specific nodes
by using the threshold cryptography scheme [24] with several
threshold levels to offer nodes flexibility in selecting an appro-
priate security level for a given application. With this approach
the fault tolerant and hierarchical key management services
are ensured. Unfortunately, the approaches based on threshold
cryptography have some drawbacks: Firstly, the n nodes must
be initialized by a trusted authority which is responsible for
introducing the partial secret of CA role. On the other hand,
an external administration is necessary to configure the system
and establish the architecture. Secondly, the number k must
be a trade-off between availability and robustness, it must be
frequently updated. Thirdly, the system overloads the network
since the node must send at least k requests instead of sending
only one request to obtain a certificate or revocation (i.e., k−1
messages are needed).
A few work tried to introduce the fully CA distribu-
tion without using the threshold cryptography. We quote the
Hubaux et al.’s [6] approach and Satizabal et al.’s [23] system.
In these systems, each user is able to generate a certificate
for other users. Certificates are stored and distributed by the
users themselves. In this system, each user maintains a local
certificate repository. When two users want to check the public
keys of each other, they merge their local certificate reposi-
tories to find appropriate certificate chains. The drawback of
this approach is the assumption that trust is transitive and the
system becomes more vulnerable to malicious nodes.
Several work introduce the cluster concept for security in
MANETs particularly for the CA distribution. Dong et al.
[10] and Bechler et al. [4] propose the distribution of the
CA service by using threshold cryptography and introduce
the cluster structure. The cluster concept is adopted to provide
the CA service and proactive secret shared update protocol.
In Bechler et al.’s [4] approach, the certification of any
guest node must possess a certain number (W ) of warranty
certificates from warrantor nodes. Then, it must request at
least (k) certificates from different cluster heads (CHs), whose
association gives the network certificate. Unfortunately, this
approach is not realistic because the warrantor nodes do not
have any information about the new node to be guaranteed.
To overcome this problem, the authors of [22] proposed a
distributed architecture which divides the network into clusters
and distributes the CA in each cluster to secure the network.
They defined a new trust model and new concept of Dynamic
Demilitarized Zone (DDMZ) to secure the CA node in each
cluster against a single point failure and to monitor the nodes
in the cluster.
B. Mechanism Design Application
Mechanism design is a sub-field of microeconomics and
game theory [15]. It uses game theory tools to achieve a
desired goal. The main difference between game theory and
mechanism design is that the former is used to study what
could happen when independent players act selfishly, whereas
mechanism design allows us to define the game in such a way
that the outcome of the game, known as the Social Choice
Function (SCF), will be played by independent players accord-
ing to the rules set by the mechanism designer. Mechanism
design has been used in computer science by Nisan and Ronen
[19] for solving least cost path and task scheduling problems
using algorithmic mechanism design. Distributed mechanism
design based on VCG is first introduced in [11] to compute
the lowest cost routes for all source-destination pairs and
payments for transit nodes on all the routes. It is a direct
extension of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which causes
modest increases in routing table size and convergence time.
Currently in MANET, mechanism design is mainly used
for routing purposes. In [2], the authors present a truthful
adhoc-VCG mechanism to find the most cost-efficient route
in the presence of selfish nodes. In [8], the authors provide
an incentive compatible auction scheme to enable packet
forwarding service in MANET using VCG. A continuous
auction process runs to determine who should obtain how
much of the bandwidth and at what price. Incentives are in
the form of monetary rewards. On the other hand, mechanism
design is recently used for intrusion detection in MANET [21].
The authors propose a distributed election mechanism that
selects the most cost efficient node to play the role of leader
IDS in a cluster. To motivate nodes to behave normally during
the election process, the authors design incentives, based on
VCG, in the form of reputation where intrusion detection
service is offered to nodes according to their reputation. To
catch misbehaving leader after election, a catch an punish
model is proposed. As an extension for their work, the authors
proposed in [17] a distributed leader-IDS election mechanism
that can elect the most cost efficient leaders without running
any clustering algorithm.
C. Game Theory Application
Game theory [18] has been successfully applied to many
disciplines including economics, political science, and com-
puter science. Game theory usually considers a multi-player
decision problem where multiple players with different ob-
jectives can compete and interact with each other. Game
theory classifies games into two categorizes: Non-cooperative
and cooperative. Non-cooperative games are games with two
or more players that are competing with each other. On
the other hand, cooperative games are games with multi-
players cooperating with each other in order to achieve the
greatest possible total benefits. To predict the optimal strategy
used by intruders to attack a network, the authors of [20]
model a non-cooperative game-theoretic model to analyze
the interaction between intruders and the IDS in a wired
infrastructure network. They solve the problem using a zero-
sum non-cooperative game with complete information about
the intruder.
In complete information game, the type, strategy spaces,
and payoff functions of both players are known. In [1], the
authors aim at demonstrating the suitability of game theory
for development of various decision, analysis, and control
algorithms in intrusion detection. They address some of the
fundamental network security tradeoffs, and give illustrative
examples in different platforms. They propose two different
schemes based on game theoretic techniques and consider a
generic model of distributed IDSs equipped with a network
of sensors. Bayesian Nash is used in [14] to analyze the
interaction between the intruder and defender in static and
dynamic scenarios. The authors provide a hybrid detection
approach.
These existing studies clearly show that game theory and
mechanism design are strong candidates for providing the
much-needed mathematical framework for analyzing the inter-
action between CA and intruders and motivate the nodes to
reveal truthfully their selection criteria function. To the best of
our knowledge, our work is among the first efforts on securing
the CA. We use mechanism design to motivate the nodes to
participate on being selected as RA to form the DDMZ. A
nonzero-sum noncooperative game based on Bayesian Nash
equilibrium is used to model the interaction between the CA
and intruder, taking into consideration that the precise identity
of the intruder is typically unknown. The solution of such a
game guides the CA to add more RA nodes according to the
game derived threshold.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
To protect the CA node, a set of trusted (Tm = 1) nodes
(one-hop) are selected to play the role of RA and form the
Dynamic Demilitarized Zone (DDMZ) [22]. This is done by
filtering the traffic of CA searching for attacks. Moreover, the
role of these nodes is to monitor the behavior of other nodes
in the cluster. The problems facing this model are: First, the
cluster formation requires at least two trusted nodes which
prevents clusters with one trusted node to be created. This will
lead nodes to join other clusters which increases the number
of nodes in the cluster and negatively affect the cluster’s
services (i.e., routing, intrusion detection, key distribution and
certification). Second, all trusted nodes are required to monitor
and play the role of RA to ensure security robustness which
causes nodes to consume a lot of resources and decrease the
cluster’s lifetime. Additionally, the more is the RA, the more
is the probability of channel collision at CA. Third, it is not
granted that the CA coverage area is always monitored by the
RA nodes. This is because the DDMZ formation condition
did not consider the CA coverage area which can be violated
by an attacker.
Solving these problems will start by proposing a solution
for cluster formation condition where clusters can be created
using one trusted node which is selected as CA. This propo-
sition faces the following challenges: First, nodes that will
be selected to play the role of RA, to form DDMZ, are
no more belonging to the confident community which can
lead nodes to behave selfishly. We define selfish node as an
economically rational node whose objective is to maximize
its benefits (payoffs). Second, RA selection will be based on
specific criteria such as energy level, trust level, mobility and
connectivity degree. Some of these information are considered
as private where nodes can reveal fake information in order not
to be selected and preserve their resources. Incentives must be
given in the form of trust in order to motivate nodes to reveal
their private information. The question arises here is: How to
design the incentive in such a way where truth telling is the
dominant strategy for all nodes? Third, to increase the cluster’s
lifetime and to avoid channel collision, a specific number of
nodes must be selected to form the DDMZ. Moreover, these
nodes should be able to monitor the CA coverage area by
filtering all the CA traffic. The question that we address is:
What is the minimum number of RA nodes needed to achieve
this goal? Such a model is known as moderate since few
nodes are selected to form the DDMZ. Finally, to increase
the security of the DDMZ, RA nodes have to be added to the
sector where the probability of attacks is high. Such a model
is known as robust DDMZ. The question that arises here is:
When to step from moderate to robust DDMZ? What is the
security threshold needed to step to robust DDMZ?
In this paper, we propose a new DDMZ formation con-
dition where RA nodes will be selected by the CA based
on their selection-criteria function which is defined in terms
of nodes’ private information. Here, we assume that the CA
is equipped with an antenna that can work as directional or
omni-directional. RA election algorithm is designed where the
directional antenna is used to create the DDMZ by selecting
a set of RA nodes that meet the selection criteria. This will
increase the robustness of DDMZ. On the other hand, omni-
directional antenna is used to overhear the RA nodes and
monitor their behavior. Moreover, we propose a model based
on VCG mechanism [13] to motivate nodes to reveal truthfully
their private information. Payments are issued in the form of
reputation (trust) to motivate nodes to say the truth. Finally, we
model a nonzero-sum noncooperative game to find the security
threshold needed to step from moderate to robust DDMZ.
These propositions will help to increase the cluster’s security
and lifetime and reduce channel collision at the CA.
IV. MANET CLUSTERING AND CA ELECTION
ALGORITHM
In this section, we devise a clustering algorithm that clusters
MANET and elects a CA in each cluster. To ensure the
security, it is assumed that set of the nodes belong to a
confident community. For clusters with more than one trusted
node, the CA is selected among these nodes based on node’s
stability which increases cluster’s lifetime. Furthermore, the
clustering algorithm ensures the authentication and integrity
of the transited data during the election process.
Each trusted node sends two successive hello message in
order to calculate the Relative Mobility (RM ), after that, it
announces itself as CA with a certain cluster’s size (k-hop).
When a trusted node receives a beacon, from one of its neigh-
bors, it executes clustering algorithm 1 to change its status
from cluster-head (CA) to cluster-member. The decision to
change the status from CA to cluster-member depends on two
main parameters: Security and stability. A CA is considered
as more stable than others if it has a low relative mobility.
Any trusted node with relative mobility more than a specific
threshold is considered as unstable and thus will not be consid-
ered during the CA selection. The nodes situated between two
adjacent clusters can become gateway (GW) [22]. Algorithm 1
is executed by each node that belongs to confident community.
where, Packet−Authentication− Integrity− checking()
is the function which consists to check the integrity and the
authentication of the election packet. HopCount indicates the
hop number of the election packet.RMi is the relative mobility
of node i and DNi is the degree of the neighbors nodes of
the node i.
Once the CA node is elected per cluster, it starts to transmit
cluster’s beacon in order to inform the cluster’s member nodes
about its availability. The cluster’s nodes that are not receiving
any beacon from a CA for a predefined period of time is
considered as unavailable.
Algorithm 1: Clustering Algorithm (SDCAV 2)
When node j receives an election packet from node i;
begin
Packet-Authentication-Integrity-checking();
if (HopCount >= k) then No−Competition;
Goto(end);
else if (RMi < RMj) OR ((RMi == RMj) AND
(DNj < DNi)) then
Accept node i as CA;
else if (RMj < RMi) OR (DNj > DNi) then
node j remains as CA candidate;
else if (RMi == RMj) AND (DNj == DNi) then
apply Lowest-ID;
end
V. A MODERATE DDMZ MODEL
In this section, we present our RA election mechanism for
truthfully electing the RA nodes that will serve as DDMZ
and belong to non-confident community. In Subsection V-A,
we describe the RA election model followed by the selection
criteria function F for electing RA nodes is given in Subsec-
tion V-B. Subsection V-C formulates our mechanism model
using with the payment function followed by an example.
A. RA Election Model
Once the CA node of each cluster is selected, it elects a set
of RA nodes that belongs to non-confident community with a
certain trust-level. The RA nodes are located at one-hop from
the CA node. The role of RA nodes is to protect CA node
against attack from unknown nodes such as Denial of Service
(DoS). Any packet destined to CA node must be analyzed
and filtered by RA nodes. To achieve this goal, a moderate
DDMZ should be created by selecting the best RA nodes
based on nodes’ selection criteria function and according
to nodes location. This will increase the performance of
DDMZ since the CA coverage area is protected by RA
nodes. Selecting RA nodes according to their location requires
a secure localization algorithm [7]. To avoid running such
algorithm, directional antenna is used by the CA where the
CA’s zone is divided into 6 sectors [12]. The sectors are
numbered from 1 to 6 starting with zone 1 heading east
as shown in figure 1. Dividing the CA zone to 6 sectors
with 250 m omni transmission range leads to 450 m of
directional transmission range [12]. With such type of antenna,
the CA node can allocate the location of one-hop nodes.
This proposition allows us to prolong cluster’s lifetime by
electing the minimum number of RA nodes that covers the
6 sectors. With 250 m of omni transmission range, each RA
node can cover its own sector and the left and right sectors.
This means that 3 RA nodes are required to form a moderate
DDMZ where RA nodes are selected from disjoint sectors.
This means that RA nodes cannot be selected from the same
sector or from two consecutive sectors. For example, if a CA
 Fig. 1. Cluster of 10 nodes divided into 6 Sectors
chooses node N3 then nodes from sectors 1, 2 or 3 cannot be
selected. Thus, DDMZ can be formulated by selecting nodes
from sectors {1, 3, 5} or {2, 4, 6}. The selection between
both combination depends on the selection criteria function
F () given in subsection V-B. This formation condition will
increase the monitoring coverage area for the cluster and thus
the DDMZ is efficiently able to protect the CA node from
attacks originated from different directions. The objective of
maximizing the selection-criteria function (F) of DDMZ can
be expressed by the following Social Choice Function (SCF):
SCF = S(C) = max
∑
i∈N
Fi (1)
This means that the summation of F given in Subsection V-B
of the selected RA nodes has to be maximum overall the set
of possible combination. Clearly, to maximize the summation,
the nodes need to reveal their truthful function F. In the next
subsection, we design a mechanism design based incentive
model for encouraging each node in revealing its true function
value.
B. Selection Criteria Function (F )
The selection criteria function has the following parameters:
Trust Level/Metric (Z1): This metric determines the con-
fident level of nodes which is evaluated by the monitoring
mechanism. Each node has a reputation generated by the
monitoring mechanisms according to its contribution in the
network like forwarding ratio or others network’ services.
Stability Metric (Z2): RA node’s stability is based on the
relative mobility according to the CA node (it is the private
information of a node). The mobility metric is based on the
power level (received signal strength) detected at receiving
node RxPr, it is indicative of the distance between the trans-
mitting and receiving node pairs. The ratio of RxPr between
two successive packets transmissions gives a good knowledge
about the relative mobility between two neighboring nodes.
The relative mobility metric at node Y with respect to X is
defined by RMrely (x) [3].
RM relY (X) = 10 log10
RxPrnewX→Y
RxProldX→Y
(2)
Residual Energy Metric (Z3): This metric determines the
residual energy level of the nodes. This is also a private
information of a node.
Connectivity Degree (Z4): It is the number of links a node
is connected with. In other word, connectivity degree is the
number of one hop neighbors of a node. A node having
greater connect degree means that it can cover more nodes
for monitoring in the cluster.
Based on the above four parameters, our selection criteria
function F is defined as follows:
F =
4∑
i=1
WiZi (3)
where Wi is the weight of each parameter i. According to
the security context, the weight of the trust metric (W1) must
be greater than others metrics. However, the stability (W2)
and the residual energy (W3) have the same weight, because
both metrics have the same importance in the model. When
the stability metric is low, the RA node cannot be insured for
its role for long time. On the other hand, when the residual
energy metric is low, the RA will not be able to do its task
for long time. Finally, the connectivity degree metric (W4)
has the lowest weight since it does not impact the security of
the cluster. If the connectivity degree is low, then more RA
nodes are needed for coving the whole cluster. Therefore, we
can establish the relation between metrics’ weight as follows:
W1 > W2 =W3 > W4 and
∑4
i=1Wi = 1.
The stability and residual energy are the private information,
which needs to be truthful in order to have a truthful calculated
function F . We give incentive in terms of reputation so that
nodes are motivated to participate and reveal their truthful
function F (). To achieve this goal, the payment should be
designed in such a way truth-telling is the dominant strategy
for each node.
C. Mechanism Model
We treat the RA election as a game where the N mobile
nodes are the agents/players. Each node plays by revealing its
own private information (selection criteria function (F )) which
is based on the node’s type θi. The type θi is drawn from each
player’s available type set Θi={Normal, Selfish}. Each player
selects his own strategy/type according to how much the node
values the outcome (i.e., The amount of reputation granted). If
the player’s strategy is normal then the node reveals the true
selection criteria function F . We assume that each player i
has a utility function [15]:
ui(θi) = pi − vi(θi, o(θi, θ−i)) (4)
where,
• θ−i is the type of all the other nodes except i.
• vi is the valuation of player i of the output o ∈ O,
knowing that O is the set of possible outcomes. In our
case, if the node is elected then vi is the value of the
selection criteria function Fi.
• pi ∈ ℜ is the payment given by the mechanism to the
elected node. Payment is given in the form of reputation.
Nodes that are not elected receive no payment.
Note that, ui(θi) is what the player usually seeks to maxi-
mize. It reflects the amount of benefits gained by player i if
he follows a specific type/strategy θi. Players might deviate
from revealing the truthful value of the function F if that
could lead to a better payoff. Therefore, our mechanism must
be strategy-proof where truth-telling is the dominant strategy.
To play the game, every node declares its corresponding
function F , where each node’s reported function value is the
input for our mechanism (i.e., input vector). For each input
vector, the mechanism calculates its corresponding output
o = o(θ1, . . . , θn) and a payment vector p = (p1, . . . , pn).
Payments are used to motivate players to behave in accordance
with the mechanism goals. The goal of our mechanism is to
motivate nodes to say the truth and compute the output o that
is equal to the SCF defined in Equation 1.
Payment Design: Based on the selection criteria function
revealed by all the nodes to the mechanism, CA elects a set
of nodes according to the requirement to play the role of RA
that forms the DDMZ. Our mechanism provides payments
to the elected RAs for running their monitor and forming a
DDMZ. The nodes that are not elected will not not receive
any payment. The payment is in the form of reputations,
which are then used to increase the trust level and allocate
the cluster’s services. Hence, any node will strive to increase
its reputation in order to increase the trust level.
According to VCG [2], the following design of payment is
strategy proof where truth-telling is the dominant strategy:
pi = Fi +
∑
i∈N
vi(o∗)−
∑
j∈N
vj(o∗) (5)
where o∗ is the optimal selection of nodes that maximizes
the sum of all the agent’s declared function value. Here,∑
j∈N vj(o∗) denotes the second maximum summation as-
suming without node i.
D. RA Election Algorithm
Once the CA node is determined by Algorithm 1, it
elects the RA nodes for the cluster. Initially, the CA sends
Start − Election message to each sector according to
Algorithm 2 using the directional antenna. Then, the CA
waits for the reply from the member nodes for a fixed
interval of time, T1. On expiration of T1, it sends the
Start − Election to the next sector. Thus, steps 2 and 3
are repeated for all the 6 sectors. At the end of T6, the
CA accumulates all the values of function F from the
member nodes. Then, it determines the RAs according to the
equation 1 and calculates the payment according to equation
5. Finally, CA sends a Payment − confirmation message
to the elected RAs.
Algorithm 2: Executed by CA node
1. For Sector 1 to 6:
2. Sends Start−Election message to its neighbors;
3. Wait for the reply from the member nodes;
4. End For
5. Determine the RA nodes for DDMZ;
6. Send Payment− confirmation to the RAs;
On the other hand, member nodes wait for the Start −
Election message from CA. Once received, it calculates
the function value, F and sends it to CA for optimal RA
determination. The member nodes then wait for the election
results from the CA. Elected RA nodes receive a Payment−
confirmation message from the CA and it launches its
monitor to perform the role of RA.
Algorithm 3: Executed by Member nodes
1. Receive Start− Election message from CA;
2. Calculate and Send the Function value F to CA node;
3. If node receive Payment− confirmation from CA;
4. Play the role of RA;
5. end If;
E. Example
To illustrate the RA election scheme, we consider the cluster
of Figure 1. Since our model is repeatable, we present the
election process at the 10th round. The reputation at the 9th
round is given in the first row of Table I.
TABLE I
DDMZ FORMATION EXAMPLE
Nodes N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8 N9
Reputation 9th 100 80 75 60 50 65 110 120 60
Function Value 3 5 9 8 7 6 6 5 3
Reputation 10th 100 80 84 72 58 65 110 120 60
To elect the RA nodes in the 10th round, the CA node sends
Start−Election message to all the sectors one after another.
Upon receiving the Start − Election message, the member
nodes send their function value, F to the CA node according
to Algorithm 2 and 3. The corresponding function values are
given in the second row of Table I. Then, the CA node elects
the RA nodes based on RA selection model (Section V-A).
Here, the winners (or elected RAs) are nodes N3, N4 and
N5 since the summation of their function value is maximum,
which is 20. Moreover, the CA calculates the payments of
the elected RAs according to equation 5. For example, the
payment for the node N3 is P3 = 5 + (20 − 16) = 9. This
is because if node N3 did not participate then the winners
would have been nodes N1, N2 and N6 and thus the maximum
summation would have been 16. Similarly, the payments for
the node N4 is P4 = 8 + (20 − 16) = 12 and N5 is P5 =
7 + (20 − 19) = 8. Finally, the CA sends a Payment −
confirmation message to the elected RA nodes and increases
the reputation of the nodes which is shown in the third row
of Table I. On receiving the confirmation, the elected nodes
launches the monitors to play to role of RA.
F. Cluster Risk Assessment Strategies
In order to allocate a security level to the cluster, the CA
must assess the security risk. The cluster security risk is an
important parameter that indicates to the CA if the security
level needs to be increased or decreased. In this paper, the
cluster security risk is called the cluster risk factor (CRF ).
The assessment of the CRF is complex, because it depends
on many uncertain parameters such as :
• The probability of attack against the CA node, which
depends on the probability of attacks against the RA
nodes. If the attacker wants to launch an attack against
the CA, it must first attack the RA nodes (DDMZ).
• The probability that there are attackers in the cluster,
which depends on the number of unknown nodes in the
cluster. If there are unknown nodes, it means that the trust
model does not have enough information about them.
Then the potential attacker nodes may belong to this class
of unknown nodes.
• The probability to compromise the trusted nodes. The
trusted nodes may be captured and the private information
may be disclosed.
• The probability to attack the gateway nodes in order to
disconnect some clusters from the network.
• Probability of DoS attacks against the DDMZ. An
attacker can launch jamming attacks against the DDMZ
area in order to prevent the RA and CA nodes from
communicating. This requires more than one attacker to
be able to run such type of attack since RA nodes belong
to different sectors.
In order to make the security level in the cluster dynamic and
to design a reactive security model, the CA node must assess
the possibility of having any of the cluster security risk events.
The risk assessment strategies are presented in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Cluster Risk Assessment Strategies
The risk metrics and definitions: In order to accurately
measure the potential impact of a risk in the cluster, a set
of important parameters must be defined and dynamically
updated. These parameters must be enough exhaustive to
ensure the good working of the cluster.
The vulnerability and threat assessment : At this stage, the
configuration of the cluster must be scanned and evaluated.
For example, the number of RA nodes, the arrival rate of
unknown nodes, the CA area coverage and the nodes density
in the cluster. This information is important to assess the
vulnerability of the cluster and its effectiveness.
The monitoring process: It allows us to monitor the nodes
behavior in order to detect the malicious activities. In each
cluster, the set of RA nodes plays the role of the monitor nodes
and generates a report for each node belonging to the cluster.
For example, the cooperative and malicious nodes activities
can be the subject of monitoring.
The decision: At this stage, the decision regarding the
reconfiguration of security parameters is made. The decision
depends on the results of the monitoring process, the vulner-
ability and threat assessment stages. This step gives us some
information about how to manage the risk, we identify three
reactions options: 1) To accept the risk and not to react, 2)
To mitigate the risk by increasing the security level, which
can effect nodes resources, 3) To interrupt the services and
transfer the risk to other nodes which are able to manage the
risks. Here, we selected choice two and we propose a solution
that consider both security and resource consumption.
Reconfiguration of the security parameters: The reconfigu-
ration depends on the decision stage. The goal of this stage
is to mitigate the risk and to avoid the attacks. For example,
when the risk is considered high, the number of RA nodes
must be increased. In the following section, we derive the
security threshold that is needed to reconfigure our DDMZ.
VI. A MODERATE TO ROBUST GAME MODEL
The RA election model, proposed before, can form a
moderate DDMZ since one RA is monitoring and filtering
the CA’s incoming traffic for almost three sectors. This model
can be used whenever the probability of attack is low. It will
help to reduce the overall resource consumption of a cluster.
Once the probability of attack against the CA is high, the
CA should add more RA nodes to the sectors in which an
attack has been launched from. The CA is able to allocate
the side from which an attack is generated from since CA’s
incoming traffic must be forwarded from a RA. Therefore, the
CA decides that the DDMZ must step into the robust mode
in these sectors by adding more RA nodes. A mechanism
is needed to decide when to go from moderate mode to
robust mode. To formally address this issue, we formulate a
game with two players: CA and intruder. The objective of the
intruder is to attack the CA node without being filtered by the
RA. To achieve this an attacker can either tries to compromise
the RA node or to overload it with high density of traffic that
can lead the RA to forward some packets to the CA without
filtering.
A. The Game Definition
We model the game as nonzero-sum noncooperative game
with incomplete information about the players where each
player has a private information about his/her preferences. In
our case, the CA type is known to all the players while the
sender type is selected from the type set Θ = {Malicious (M),
Normal (N)}. Knowing that the sender type is a private
information. Bayesian Equilibrium [25] dictates that sender’s
TABLE II
MODERATE TO ROBUST GAME
Strategy Robust Moderate
Attack ErV − Ca, ErV − Cr EmV − Ca, EmV − Cm
Not-Attack 0, −Cr 0, −Cm
action depends on his/her type θ. By observing the behavior
of the sectors, we can determine the behavior of the sender at
time tk, the CA can calculate the posterior belief evaluation
function µtk+1(θi|ai) using the following Bayes’ rule:
µtk+1(θi|ai) =
µtk(θi) Ptk(ai|θi)∑
θi∈Θ
µtk(θi) Ptk(ai|θi)
(6)
where µtk(θi) > 0 and Ptk(ai|θi) is the probability that
strategy ai is observed at this stage of the game given the
type θ of the node i. It is computed as follows:
Ptk(Attack|θi = M) = Em ×O + Fm(1−O)
Ptk(Attack|θi = N) = Fm
where O is the observed behavior, which is determined by
the CA monitor. Fm is the false rate generated by the CA.
Em is the expected detection rate by a RA (moderate mode).
We define the intruder’s pure strategy as Ai =
{Attack,Not Attack}. On the other hand, CA strategy is
selected from the strategy space AIDS = {Robust,Moderate}.
By solving this game using pure strategy, there is no Nash
equilibrium. Thus, mixed strategy is used to solve the game
where q is the probability to run in robust mode and p is the
probability to attack by the attacker. In Table II, the game is
defined where the utility function of the CA by playing the
Robust strategy while the attacker plays the Attack strategy is
defined as Er V − Cr . It represents the payoff of protecting
the CA node, which values V , from being compromised by
the attacker, where Er V >> Cr . On the other hand, the
payoff of the attacker if the intrusion is not detected is defined
as Er V − Ca. It is considered as the gain of the attacker
for compromising the CA node. Additionally, we define
Em V −Cm as the payoff of IDS, if strategy Moderate is played
while the attacker strategy remains unchanged. Conversely, the
payoff of the attacker if the intrusion is not detected is defined
as Em V − Ca. Now, if the attacker plays Not-Attack strategy
and the CA strategy is Robust then the losses of the CA
is Cr while the attacker gains/losses nothing. Moreover, the
payoff of the attacker with the same strategy and CA strategy
is Moderate is 0 while the losses of the IDS is defined as
Cm which is the cost of running the CA in moderate mode.
Where,
• Er = 1 − Er, where Er is the expected detection of an
attack in the robust mode.
• Em is the expected detection in the moderate mode. On
the other hand, Em is equal to 1−Em.
• Cr is the cost of running the DDMZ in robust mode.
We define the cost as the aggregation of the cost of
monitoring by the RAs.
• Cm is the cost of running the DDMZ in moderate mode.
• Ca is the cost of attack by the attacker.
• V is the value of the CA (asset).
B. The Game solution
To solve the game and find the optimal values of p and q, the
CA and attacker compute their corresponding utility functions
followed by the first derivative of the functions. From Table
II, the CA utility function UCA is defined as follows:
UCA = [qp(Er V − Cr) + p(1− q)(Em V − Cm)− q(1− p)Cr
−(1−q)(1−p)Cm]µ(θ = M)− [qCr+(1−q)Cm](1−µ(θ = M))
The main objective of the CA is to maximize this utility
function by choosing for a fixed p∗, a q∗ strategy that max-
imizes the probability of protection and leads to equilibrium
where the following holds:
UIDS(p
∗
, q
∗) ≥ UIDS(p
∗
, q)
To achieve this goal, the CA will calculate the optimal
value of p∗ by finding the first derivative with respect to
q∗ and setting it to zero. This will result to the following:
p∗ = Cr−Cm
µ V (Er−Em)
The value of p∗ is used by the CA to decide whether to
add more RAs to the region where an attack came from. The
CA computes the belief µ, as in Equation 6, of each RA’s
region which reflects the sender belief. If the sender type is
malicious and decided to attack by launching an attack the
expected probability to be detected by CA is Em. Since the
attack could be launched iteratively and missed in the coming
iterations, the CA will decide to add more RA nodes in the
region in which an attack is observed, if the probability of
attack is greater than p∗ = Cr−Cm
µ V (Er−Em)
.
On the other hand, the utility function Ua of the attacker is
defined as follows:
Ua = qp(Er V − Ca) + p(1− q)(Em V − Ca)
The main objective of the attacker is to maximize this utility
function by choosing for a fixed q∗, a p∗ that maximizes
the probability of compromising the victim node and leads
to equilibrium where the following holds:
Ua((p
∗|θ = M), q∗) ≥ Ua((p|θ = M), q
∗)
To maximize the utility function, it is sufficient to set the
first derivative with respect to p∗ to zero which will be equal
to: q∗ = Ca−Em V
(Er−Em) V
.
From the solution of the game, the attacker best strategy
is to attack once the probability of running the DDMZ in
robust mode is less than q∗ = Ca−Em V
(Er−Em) V
. To achieve this, the
attacker will observe the behavior of the CA at time tk to
 Fig. 3. 3 external nodes with N11 is attacking CA
determine whether to attack or not at time tk+1 by comparing
its estimated observation with the derived threshold.
C. Example
After the RA election is completed, the DDMZ is in
moderate mode where each RA is responsible for monitoring
and filtering its coverage area which is more than one sector.
To demonstrate how more RA nodes are added according to
the security needs, we show the interaction between CA and
3 external nodes. As an example, we select node N3 as the
RA node where an intruder is targeting to attack the CA
through it. Figure 3, describes an attack scenario where an
attack could be directed to CA node either from node N11,
N12 or N13. Hence, the CA will use the belief function of
Equation 6 to calculate the belief of each RA’s region (more
than one sector) using the prior observed actions. For example,
we assume that the CA’s belief regarding each RA’s region
which reflects external node’s belief is µ = {µ11 = 0.7, µ12 =
0.2, µ13 = 0.1}. According to RA region’s belief, the CA
computes the threshold that determines the behavior of the
external nodes (i.e., attack or not). If the probability of attack
is greater than the computed threshold then the CA should
add more RA nodes to the region in which an attack came
from. For example, if the threshold of attack by node N11 is
0.18, assuming that Cr −Cm = 10, VCA = 100 and Er −Em
= 0.83, then the CA node will add more RA nodes to the
region where N3 is allocated. This is because the value of the
CA, with respect to the cluster, is much more than the cost
of running the DDMZ in robust mode. Hence, launching the
DDMZ in robust mode by adding more RA nodes to the
region in which an attack came from is affected by the ratio
of monitoring cost to the value of the CA node (i.e, security
of the cluster).
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate and compare the performance of
the new proposed secure clustering algorithm (SDCAV 2) with
the previous model SDCAV 1 [22]. We have implemented
our clustering algorithm as described previously. We use the
Network Simulator (NS-2) [16] with CMU wireless extensions
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Fig. 4. Impact of selfish node on the lifetime of Network
to simulate our algorithm. Simulation scenarios were generated
with parameters listed in table III.
TABLE III
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Value in our simulation
Number of nodes (N) 50
Network size (mxn) 670x670m2
Mobility [0-20 m/sec]
Transmission Range 50 m - 250 m
Pause time 3.0 s
Simulation time 200 s
At first, we motivate our work showing the impact of selfish
nodes on the network. As mentioned before, nodes can behave
selfishly before the election. A node shows selfishness before
election by refusing to serve as RA. This selfishness has a
serious impact on resource consumption of the normal nodes.
Figure 4 depicts the impact of selfish nodes on the life of
normal nodes. The result indicates that normal nodes will carry
out more the duty of RA and die faster whenever the number
of selfish nodes increase. Thus, the presence of selfish node
effect the lifetime of the entire network.
After we illustrated the impact of selfishness on the lifetime
of normal nodes, we need to show the performance of our
model on both: number of clusters and DDMZ formation. In
Figure 5.(a), we show the average number of CA nodes that
can create clusters. The figure shows that as the transmission
range increases the number of clusters decreases for both mod-
els. Due to the new cluster formation conditions, the number
of CA nodes of our model SDCAV 2 is greater than the
previous one SDCAV 1. In SDCAV 1, clusters are formulated
by at least two trusted nodes, where as in SDCAV 2, cluster
formation needs one trusted node. Hence, we can conclude
that the new model (SDCAV 2) is more flexible than the
previous one with respect to cluster’s formation. Thus, nodes’
CA service will be enhanced and probability of detecting
the misbehaving nodes can be increased since nodes will be
distributed over more number of CAs.
Now, we need to show that the selection criteria function
F and the directional antenna selection are needed to form a
moderate DDMZ. First, we analyze the distribution of the RAs
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Fig. 5. (a) The average CA node versus transmission range (b) The potential RA node number/sector (transmission range=250m) (c) The maximum value
reached by F()/sector with transmission range=250m and w1 = 0.5, w2 = w3 = 0.2 and w4 = 0.1
in each cluster according to our proposed directional antenna
selection model. Our clustering algorithm divides 50 nodes
over 5 clusters when the transmission range is 250m. Figure
5.(b) illustrates the number of potential RA nodes in each
cluster’s sector. We notice that cluster 5 does not have enough
RAs to form a moderate DDMZ. Selecting the nodes based
on the selection criteria can still be valid and nodes will be
motivated to reveal their function F but selected RA nodes
cannot cover the CA coverage area. On the other hand, the
other clusters have sufficient RAs to form a moderate DDMZ.
As an example, cluster 1 has RAs in all sectors. Thus, it can
form a moderate DDMZ by selecting RAs from sectors 1, 3,
5.
Finally, we show how the value of function F () is used to
select RAs. Figure 5.(c) shows the maximum value reached
by the function F () in each clusters’ sector. This information
is useful for the CA in order to select the RA nodes since the
function F () determines the ability of the RA nodes to form a
moderate DDMZ. We notice that in cluster 3, sector 3 has the
maximum value of F () among all the sectors. However, F ()
value is null in sectors 2 and 4. Hence, the CA will choose
RA from sector 1, 3, 5. Thus, the CA nodes select the RAs
not only based on the function F (), but also based on the
location (the sectors in which it belongs to) of the RA nodes
in order to form a moderate DDMZ.
To simulate our moderate to robust model, we assume that
the CA is able to detect attacks that are not filtered by the
RA node. The output of the CA ranges between 0 and 1. If
the computed output is less than 0.8 then it is classified as
a normal behavior, otherwise it is abnormal (attack). Figure
6.a shows the behavior of an external node (node N11 in the
previous example) for two different attack scenarios for 40
consecutive rounds. To determine the type of the sender (N11),
the posterior belief function is calculated using Equation 6
with prior belief µ0 = 0.5, Fm = 0.1 and Em = 0.83.
Figure 6.b shows the posterior belief of the leader for these
two attack scenarios. The belief for the first attack scenario
converges to 1 faster than the second attack scenario. This is
because in the first scenario the attacker starts to attack earlier
compared to the second scenario. Once the belief reaches 1,
it does not go down even if the attacker is not attacking
since the type already been identified. After calculating the
belief, the CA computes the attack threshold. The CA adds
more RA nodes in the sector in which that attack came
from. Figure 6.c illustrates the cumulative energy consumption
by robust DDMZ for the two attack scenarios (i.e., having
more RA nodes added). We assume that the robust DDMZ
mode consumes 5 joules of energy for one round. Thus, if
the robust DDMZ mode is always monitoring it consumes
40 × 5 = 200J for the 40 rounds. On the other hand, in our
model the DDMZ consumes 145J and 100J for the two
attack scenarios respectively. This will prolong the DDMZ
lifetime. Thus, the robust DDMZ mode is launched according
to the security needs.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Dynamic Demilitarized Zone (DDMZ) is previously
proposed as a solution for protecting the CA node against
potential attacks. It is formed from one or more RA nodes
where the CA and RA nodes belong to the confident com-
munity. Clusters with one confident node, CA, cannot be
created and thus clusters sizes are increased which negatively
affect clusters services and stability. Moreover, clusters with
high density of RA can cause channel collision at the CA.
Additionally, clusters lifetime are reduced since RA monitors
are always launched and thus more resources are consumed.
Thus, we proposed a model based on mechanism design that
allow clusters with single trusted node (CA) to be created. The
mechanism is able to motivate nodes that does not belong
to the confident community to participate by giving them
incentives in the form of trust, which can be used for clusters
services. Moreover, a RA selection algorithm is proposed that
selects nodes based on a predefined selection criteria function
(F) and nodes location. This will lead to a moderate DDMZ
that is able to preserve the security of CA and prolong the
lifetime of clusters. Once the probability of attacks is high,
more RA nodes have to be selected to form a robust DDMZ.
To achieve this goal, we formulated the problem as a nonzero-
sum noncooperative game between the CA and attacker. The
solution of the game guided both the CA and attacker to
their optimal strategy against each other. Thus, the optimal
threshold to step from moderate to robust DDMZ is derived.
Simulation results indicate that our model lead to more number
of clusters and moderate DDMZ can be created based on both:
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 Fig. 6. (a) Attack scenarios (b) Posterior Belief (c) Energy consumption by the victim
selection criteria function (F) and directional antenna selection
model. Moreover, the robust DDMZ is called according to
the security risks, which prolongs cluster’s lifetime.
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